FEDERALISM AND WATER RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT
ERNEST
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ENGELBERT*

No aspect of federalism is currently being subjected to more intensive public

inquiry and appraisal than the intergovernmental relationships of water resources
development. The rights and responsibilities of the federal government vis-a-vis
the states in this area have become a subject of increasing political and administrative
controversy ever since World War II. The warm debates over Hell's Canyon,
Dinosaur National Monument, and the Dixon-Yates contract in the recent presidential campaign remind us how prominently matters of this kind have become
major issues of public policy. Similarly, a review of federal and state-sponsored
studies within the last decade shows that there have been more major investigations of
various phases of water resources than of any other domestic function.'
To a great degree, recent public interest in this area stems from the major demands
that a growing economy, a rising standard of living, and an intensified national
defense have placed upon the nation's water resources. Ever-widening concern with
the organization and operation of water resources programs, however, must also
be associated with the re-evaluation of our federal system of government which is
currently taking place. The centralizing influences of technology and communications and two decades of unprecedented national government growth during depression and war are forcing a sober reappraisal of the role of the states and local
governments in our national system.
In no other arena are the complex aspects of federalism so starkly presented as in
water resources. Their development epitomizes, perhaps better than any other function, the need for intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, there are few functions
in which programs for improvement can so quickly produce changes in the physical
and social environment and in the character of government. Whether we turn to
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United States Department of Agriculture; Senior Organization Analyst, Task Force on Natural Resources of
the United States Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government; consultant to
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Southwest Federal Inter-Agency Technical Committee, and the Ford Foundation. Author of several
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1 From evidence assembled from materials furnished by the Council of State Governments and from
checklists of governmental reorganization studies. During 1955-56, for example, thirty-one states were
undertaking water studies of varying scope. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, TE BooK oF TBE
STATES, 1956-1957, at 376 (1956).
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the wording of the latest political party platforms or to more scholarly studies, the
significance of water resources development for our political system of federalism is
greatly evident.
It would be an exaggeration to say that our federal system has now reached the
political crossroads with respect to water resources programs and that no further
large-scale development will occur until present federal-state controversies are resolved.
The imperatives of water needs for a growing national economy will inevitably
push developments forward, whether or not the political logic and institutions have
been suffciently formulated to guide the courses of action. But it is also significant
that, as a nation, we are currently doing much soul-searching to find suitable alternatives to undue control and domination of resources developments by the federal
government on the one hand, or to the weak and inadequate programs of the states
on the other. We are less confident about solutions for this problem then we were
in the 193o's. Today, fewer writings are found to the effect that the states are outmoded as agencies for water resources development or that the nation's salvation rests
in more Tennessee Valley Authorities. Instead, the need for devising water resources
programs that will strengthen the over-all political structure is recognized.
Within this setting, it is the object of this paper (i) to review briefly the relative
positions of the federal government and the states for water resources development;
(2) to evaluate some of the intergovernmental relationships in this field; and (3) to
explore some courses of action which would strengthen, in particular, the role of the
states.
I
THE

STATus OF FEDERAL AND STATE DEVELOPMENTS

A. Legal Powers
As in so many other fields of public activity, the legal powers of both the federal
government and the states for water resources development are still evolving.
Although the Federal Constitution does not specifically mention water resources,
legislation and court decisions have demarcated primary federal and state responsibilities; but a vast legal no-man's-land still exists, particularly with respect to water
rights. Currently, there are a number of judicial cases in western states wending
their way to the nation's highest court, the decisions of which will have far-reaching
impact upon the future course of water resources development 3
The federal government's authority over water resources stems from several
basic powers granted by the Constitution, notably its powers over commerce on
navigable streams, its proprietary powers over its own lands and property, and its
'Most notable of cases on appeal to the United States Supreme Court is one in which the California
Supreme Court, by a 4 to 3 decision, invalidated the federal 16o-acre limitation in its application to

private lands.

Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties, 47 Cal.2d 6o3, 3o6 P.2d 824 (1957).

This decision

overturns a federal policy established in the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 STAT. 388, and,
if permitted to stand, could materially alter the Bureau of Reclamation's program in western states.
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powers to appropriate funds to provide for the nation's general welfare.4 In addition,
the federal government, on occasion, has been able to exercise certain jurisdiction
over streams on the basis of its war and treaty-making powers, the former being an
important legal justification for the early Tennessee Valley development Upon
these powers have been built the federal government's authority to improve navigation on navigable streams as well as nonnavigable tributaries, to carry out measures
for flood control, to undertake irrigation and reclamation programs, to develop and
dispose of hydroelectric power, to determine the use of water on the public domain,
and to engage in large-scale river basin developments which are in the general
interest. Corollary to these functions, the federal government is empowered to
engage in fish and wildlife protection, recreational programs, pollution control, and
related functions. In general, the federal government has been moving toward larger
multiple-purpose projects.6
Despite what appears to be very extensive federal powers over water resources,
however, the states are not without their own important spheres of jurisdiction,
although these have not always been vigorously prosecuted. Perhaps most important
is a state's authority, under its police power, to regulate various water activities for
the general welfare, such as the production of water for domestic purposes or the
control of sewage disposal. This, of course, includes the right to regulate industries
engaged in different aspects of water use and development where these are not in
conflict with regulations derived from federal powers. Of almost equal prominence
is a state's power to determine the allocation and distribution of both surface and
underground waters within the state. The states are permitted to adopt whatever
system of water law they choose, including the law for those lands which have passed
from the federal government to the states, provided it does not conflict with the
federal government's powers over navigation. 7 Finally, the states possess powers
to engage in interstate action with respect to water use and development. Agreements reached via interstate compacts are valid, even though these may conflict with
existing state lawY
At the risk of gross oversimplification, it can be said that, on the whole, the
federal government's powers have been used to guide and control the development
of major streams in the country, whereas the states have had greater responsibility for
the distribution and use of waters locally. In the past, most of the constitutional
questions have involved either the litigation of water rights or the demarcation of
federal and state spheres of authority. More recently, however, in keeping with
'The most comprehensive treatise on the constitutional aspects of water resources development is 3
P1REsNr's WATER REsoURcEs PoLicy Come'N, REPORT (ig5o),

entitled WATER RESOURCES LAW.

' Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
'See 3 PREslmENT's WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMNN, opp. cit. supra note 4, at 312.
To remove any question concerning water rights in states created out of federal territory, the Desert
Land Act of x877, 19 STAT. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §321 (1952), in effect provided that all nonnavigable waters on these lands should be reserved for public use under state law.
' Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 US. 92 (1938).
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the growth of public administration, more cases have turned upon the powers of
administrative agencies and the conduct of programs.
It is not unlikely, as both levels of government broaden and intensify their programs for water resources, that constitutional and legal conflicts will increase. At the
moment, there is considerable agitation in western states for a review of federal-state
legal relationships, and recently, a number of national organizations jointly sponsored
a recommendation stating that "legislation is urgent to clarify the relative authority of
the states and the federal government in the disposition of water."' Many groups
have found that the exploitation of legal issues is the best cover for an attack upon
objectionable policies. It will take nothing less than a wise development of federalistic
arrangements to keep these conflicts to a minimum.
B. Evolution of Programs
Within the legal framework, the evolution of federal and state programs for water
resources have been conditioned by many of the same broad political and economic
considerations which have influenced the development of other governmental functions. However, two unrelated factors, namely navigation and catastrophe, have
been particularly significant for determining the unfolding of federal-state relationships. The importance of American waterways in opening the continent and civilizing the frontier gave the federal government, with its power over navigation, some
strategic advantages in the development of this activity which it did not possess with
respect to some other domestic functions. Similarly, the necessity for developing
adequate protection against flood and drought disaster brought about a certain measure of intergovernmental cooperation at a far earlier stage in American history
than might otherwise have been the case.
A number of distinguishing features can be noted in the historical development
of federal-state water resources activities. Outstanding is the fact that both the
federal and state governments have given leadership to phases of water development
at various periods.1 0 For example, during the so-called canal-building era of the
nineteenth century, the states were in the forefront in improving navigation of
waterways; and a little later, along the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, they
were taking the initiative in flood control. During the latter half of the nineteenth
century, however, after state debacles and mismanagements in canal building and
levee construction, the federal government took the helm and has continued to
be in the forefront of this activity. In other fields, such as the regulation of hydroelectric power development, the states also took the first steps toward control, but
with the advent of federal intervention into this field under the Federal Power Act of
' Second Inter-Organization Conference on Water Law, St. Louis, Jan. 24-25, 1956. Organizations
represented at this conference were: American Farm Bureau Federation, Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, Engineers Joint Council, Mississippi Valley Association, National Reclamation Association,
National Rivers and Harbors Conference, and National Water Conservation Conference.
'°For a historical summary of the states' role in water resources development, see CLI-FFoD J.
HYNNING, STATE CONSERVATION OF R~souRcFs (939); see also Lepawsky, Water Resources and American
Federalism, 44 Am. POL. Sm. REv. 631 (195o).
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state and federal responsibilities have developed somewhat simultaneously,
particularly in the more progressive states. For still other water resources activities,
such as the provision of urban water supplies, the states have had virtually exclusive
sway. Viewed in perspective, the state and local governments were the most influential in determining the course of water resources development during the nineteenth century,' 2 but beginning with the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, the
federal government has gradually moved to the forefront to the point where it is
the dominating force, at least on all of the country's major streams.
Another distinguishing aspect of water resources development in this country
is that, at both the federal and state levels, water resources were initially developed
for a single purpose and not on a related basis. Thus, the functions of navigation
and flood control first received attention. Some protection of fish and wildlife was
inaugurated by the states shortly after the Civil War, and toward the turn of the
century, the first steps toward power regulation were taken. Also, during the
i88o's, the western states became concerned with irrigation, rapidly followed by
Among the functions which
federal participation through the Carey Act of 1894'
were unilaterally promoted after the turn of the century were pollution control, power
generation, and recreational development.
The concept of multiple-purpose planning for water resources does not appear
to have been publicly perceived until after i9oo, when flood control, power development, and irrigation began to be linked in development.' 4 However, it was not
until after World War I that the federal government, with the enactment of the
Federal Power Act in 192o and the inauguration of the "308 reports" in 1927,15
adopted multiple-purpose water resources development as official public policy.' 6
Among the states, California was perhaps the first to think in terms of basin-wide
development, when the legislature, in 1921, authorized the first studies leading to the
adoption of the California Water Plan in i93i.17
It is also noteworthy that much of the state development of water resources functions has come about through the initiative of local governments, with a minimum
of state direction or support. This is particularly true for irrigation, drainage, and
urban water supplies, where local districts underwrote the costs of much of the first
development. Indeed, the state governments would not be as far advanced as they are
1920,11

"14' STAT. 1063, 16 U.S.C. §§791 et seq. (1952).
"State expenditures for the improvement of inland navigation totaled more than $2oo million at the
turn of the century, more than twice the expenditures of the federal government for this purpose up to
that time. See Renne, State Conservation and Development of Natural Resources, State Government,
June 1950, p. 134.
1328 STAT. 422, 43 U.S.C. §641 (1952)-

"Cross, W. 7. McGee and the Idea of Conservation, z5 TiH HisTORIAN 148 (953), states that it was
the Inland Waterways Commission, created in 1907, "which first put before a broad public the idea
For the evolution of this concept, see also GiFFoRa PINCHOT,
of multi-purpose river basin control.
BREAING Naw GROUND (1947).

"See H.R. Doc. No. 3o8, 69 th Cong., ist Sess. (1927).
1 See 3 PREsIDENT'S WATER Rsouacs POLICy CoMm'N, op. ct. supra note 4, at 406-1o.
x See House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Central Valley Projects Documents, H.R. Doe.

No. 416, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-8 (1956).
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in some activities were it not for local enterprise. As it is, agencies of the federal
government, notably the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers, now
by-pass state agencies in many states in their dealings with local units.18
It is risky to attempt any assessment of how the federal government and the
states now stand with respect to the development and control of various water
functions. Not only do the states vary in their leadership in given fields, but there
are considerable regional differences. As examples, Wisconsin has led in utility
regulation; Montana has demonstrated considerable initiative in irrigation development; and California has fostered basin-wide planning. Yet, for the purpose of
showing the relative importance of the two levels of government for specific functions,
the following comparison can be made: The federal government now dominates
in the fields of navigation, flood control, hydroelectric power development, irrigation,
and river basin planning. The states dominate in the fields of water rights, urban
water supplies, drainage, and fish and wildlife management. The responsibilities
are more shared in the fields of power regulation, recreational planning, pollution
control, and small watershed development. On federally-sponsored and financed
projects, the federal government's influence is naturally greater. For the functions
in which state and federal responsibilities overlap, trends toward greater interlevel
cooperation have been evident, although they fall considerably short of integrated
development.
C. Comparative Advantages
During the last quarter of a century, the states have been overshadowed by the
federal government in water resources development. The federal government, it is
true, does have some inherent advantages in carrying out large-scale improvement
programs which cut across state boundaries. However, much of the federal government's superior progress has come through state default, since the states have not
effectively exploited their opportunities.
Taken as a group, the states have not maintained a consistent constitutional position with respect to their powers and responsibilities for water resources development,
nor have adequate policies been formulated to guide their relationships with the
federal government in this field. During times of prosperity, the states have overemphasized states' rights to the point where they have been so concerned with
defending their sovereign powers against encroachments by the federal government
or other states that they have not given desirable leadership to proposed undertakings. On the other hand, during periods of economic decline, the states have
shifted quickly to the other extreme of depending upon the federal government in
their solicitations for national aid. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the State
of California, where, during the early days of the depression, state officials pleaded
with the federal government to have the Central Valley Project constructed as a
"8Some of the close working relationships between local units and federal agencies arc set forth in
Cse i.as

McKiNLE,
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(952).
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federal project, and where, since World War II, there has been strong sentiment
for state repurchase of federal facilities' 9
In contrast to state fluctuations, the federal government's role has been expanding, permitting it to step into situations where the states have not had adequate
programs. As Congressman Clair Engle has pointed out in connection with the
current struggle between various groups in the State of California and the Bureau
of Reclamation:

20

The Bureau of Reclamation has often been criticized for decisions it has made. But often
the Bureau of Reclamation has made decisions because there has been no machinery in
the State of California and no adequate state law to cover the problems which have arisen.
Until the states adopt a more consistent attitude on the question of states' rights for
water resources developments, they will inevitably be at a disadvantage relative to the
federal government in this field. Overemphasis upon states' rights rather than states'
responsibilities leads to narrow and restrictive programs out of keeping with water
needs.

Much has been made of the fact that state boundaries are poorly drawn for
effective state participation in water resources development. To be sure, watersheds
do not conform to state lines; but by the same token, the federal government is
confronted with the necessity of dealing with and through the agencies of several
states to operate effectively in a region, so that the argument of state boundary limitations has been much overplayed. The extent to which state boundaries are barriers
to effecting wise water resources development will depend upon the legal and administrative arrangements that are worked out between the federal government and
the states to deal with problems that cut across state lines. On this score, state
weaknesses can be attributed more to poor water resources policies and institutional
organization than to inadequate geographical jurisdictions.
The states have also operated under a handicap in this area because the general
suspicion exists that the states are not strong enough to protect the public interest.
Historically, this suspicion is well-justified, since the states' mismanagement of mineral, forest, and public domain lands constitutes a sordid chapter in American history.
Furthermore, a few groups primarily interested in the exploitation of natural
resources appear to dominate legislatures and administrative agencies in a number of
states, particularly in the West.?' Although this domination may not always be
unwholesome, it has, nevertheless, led many to view the federal government as the
public's best representative for controlling the nation's major water resources.
1
1See HUGH G. HANSEN, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT: FEDERAL OR STATE? (Cal. Assembly Interim
Comm. Rep., Vol. 13, No. 6, 1955). It should be noted that since 1954, support for state purchase of
the Central Valley Project has declined largely because of the fear that federal support for other needed

state water construction projects would be lost.
5
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The policy-making and administrative agencies of the federal government undeniably draw support from a broader and more varied political base than do state
agencies. Moreover, where state political support may be too biased to formulate
a balanced water resources program, the federal government can counterbalance undesirable state and intraregional political pressures with pressures from other regions
and the nation. On the other hand, neither the legislative nor the executive branches
of the federal government have had anything approaching uniform success in integrating political forces into unified water programs, judging by experience in the
Missouri, Colorado, or Columbia River basins. More often than not, Congress has
abdicated its responsibilities for forming over-all policies, while administrative agencies
have worked out some form of Pick-Sloan compromise, so that the final product is
often little better than what might have been achieved through interstate negotiation.22 The evidence indicates that there needs to be a healthy interplay of federal
and state political forces if balanced water resources development is to be achieved.
On the fiscal front, there is no doubt that the federal government's superior
financial resources have given it tremendous advantages in determining the course
of development in this area. Furthermore, the costs of huge multiple-purpose
projects are more feasibly underwritten by the federal government, irrespective of
what part it may play in the project's operation. Nevertheless, the fiscal capacity of the
states to undertake major programs has not been fully assessed. Although we may
be somewhat closer to developing general criteria for determining which costs should
be borne by the states and private beneficiaries and which by the federal government,
these criteria have not been systematically applied. 23
To be sure, the states vary in their fiscal capacity, with states such as New York
and California in a much better position to undertake projects on their own credit.
Most of the states, however, have not effectively addressed themselves to the problem
of organizing their fiscal resources and working out financial arrangements with
local government units to participate systematically in water resources developments.
That much can be done by state and local initiative has been amply demonstrated
in Southern California, where state and local agencies have expended over a billion
dollars in water development and distribution facilities alone, a figure which becomes
more arresting when compared with the approximately six hundred million dollars
24
that the federal government has spent for the entire Central Valley development.
Admittedly, the Southern California achievement is unique, but it, nevertheless,
suggests that federal dominance in recent water resources programs is not wholly a
consequence of state fiscal inadequacies.
" A study of congressional failure to deal adequately with Missouri River basin development is to be
found in an article by Hart, Legislative Abdication in Regional Development, 13 J. POLITICS 393 (1951).
" Both the President's Water Resources Policy Commission and the Presidential Advisory Committee on
Water Resources Policy have sharpened the principles of cost-sharing, but these have not yet been adopted
as congressional policy. See I PRESIDENT'S WATER REsoURcFs POLICY COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 3;
Comm. ON WATER RESOURCES POLICY, WATER REsouRcEs
POLICY 29-35 (1955).
"' From figures furnished by the Los Angeles City Department of Water and Power and the Metro-
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From the standpoint of personnel and administrative organization, both the
federal government and the states show some deficiencies in water resources development, although here, again, the states are in the worse position. The federal government is definitely superior in personnel and research facilities. It has developed a

far better career service than all but a very few states and over the last half century
has built a distinguished professional corps in agencies such as the Geological
Survey, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Corps of Engineers. Moreover, with
this personnel have been established research programs and facilities which have
given the federal government distinct advantages in gathering data, conducting
investigations, and formulating programs. In contrast, the majority of states have
been slow to adopt the merit system, have maintained pay scales too low to secure
competent men, and have not provided a good working environment for the professional person. As a result, many of the states now rely primarily upon the federal
government for information in such fields as topographical mapping or water runoff.
Needless to say, under these circumstances, representatives of state agencies have
not been in a good bargaining position with their federal counterparts.
A number of other essays in this symposium deal with the inadequacies of federal
administrative organization for water resources development. However, it should
be noted here that the failure to develop more integrated organization and programs
at the federal level has had an unwholesome influence upon state administrative
operations. Federal bureaus, such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of
Engineers, have competed for the allegiance of state agencies and local units of
government.25 Conversely, state governmental units and groups have often used
their political power and influence to support the programs of federal agencies.
Although there is much that is healthy and inevitable in professional and program
liaison between federal and state agencies, interlevel interplay has also been a factor
in keeping state administrative organization splintered and has defeated much basinwide planning.20
The states have been less able than the federal government to afford the luxury
of poor administrative organization for water resources development, since so much
of a state's effectiveness in dealing with the federal government and other states
hinges upon the unified front which a state can maintain. Over the last decade,
a sizable number of the states have underwritten "little Hoover Commission" surveys
of state administrative organization, and several have recommended an integration
of water resources activities into a single agency or into a broader' department of
natural resources 2 A few states, as, for example, Arkansas and Wyoming, have
5

" ARTHUt

MAASS, MunDy WATERS: THE ARMY ENGINEERS AND THE NATION'S RIvERs (i95i), is an

excellent case study of how a federal agency uses its powers and patronage to influence state and local
authorities.
"For a number of excellent illustrations on this point, see McKINLEY, op. cit. supra note 18, and
MARIAN E. RmGEwAY, THE MISsoURI BASIN'S PICK-SLoAN
,PLAN(1955).
27

See CouNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTs, STATE REORGANiZATION IN 1950 (1950); THE BOOK op THE

STATES, 1952-1953, at 388-89 (1952); id. x956-x957, at 373-74 (x956).
States which have recently
established state water resources boards include Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and South Dakota.
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tried to overcome the lack of administrative integration by creating coordinating
councils. But on the whole, the organizational progress has not been significant,
since states have not appreciated the importance of relating water planning, pollution control, fish protection, or other activities to a program of coordinated management2 Furthermore, multiple-purpose programming has been retarded because
the states have not generally promoted drainage-basin planning, even on an intrastate
basisY9 As a result, major water resources problems within states have been obscured, and many courses of action have been ineffectual.
In summary, there are few fronts upon which the states have maintained parallel
status with the federal government in water resources development in recent years.
Although there has been a high degree of federal-state administrative cooperation for
many water resources activities, the federal government has, more often than not,
been the dominant partner. What is important to note, however, is that many of
the state shortcomings in this field stem not from lack of adequate powers or
facilities, but from a more general weakness of state governments in political, legislative, and executive affairsO0 For example, the fact that the states did not see fit
to maintain the state-wide planning programs which were inaugurated in the
i93o's has affected the subsequent course of water resources development. Yet, it is
impossible to achieve optimum results under our federal system of government
without having wholesome state participation. As the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has so aptly stated: "The larger the national and international
responsibilities of the government in Washington become, the more important it is
' 31
to have state and local governments to carry out their proper responsibilities.
II
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS

A. Federal versus State Responsibilities
What are the proper responsibilities of the federal government vis-as-vis the states

for water resources development? Should federal responsibilities be greater for
basins which cut across state boundaries than for basins which lie primarily within
the confines of one state? Should the economic wealth of a state or a region be a
relevant factor in determining the degree of federal versus state action?
" For the pattern of water resources organization in southern states, see

VERA BRISCOE, JAMES

NVA.

MARTIN, AND J. E. REEvES, SAFEGUARDING KENTUCKy'S NATURAL REsouncas (1948); Lzd S. GREENE,
VIRGINIA BROWN, AND EvAN W. IvEEsoN, RESCUED EARTIH (1948); ROBERT B. HIOHSAW, MISSISSIPI'S
WEALTH (1947); CHRISTIAN T. LARSEN, SOUTH CAROLINA'S NATURAL RESOuRCEs (1947); HUBERT
MARSHALL AND ROBERT J. YOUNG, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF FLORIDA'S NATURAL RESOuRcEs (953);
JOSEPH M. RAY AND LILLIAN WORLEY, ALABAMA'S HERITAGE (1947); PAUL W. WAGER AND DONALD B.
HAYmAN, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA (1947).
For information on western states, refer to Ostrom, State Administration of Natural Resources in the
West, 47 Am. POL. Sd. REv. 484 (i953).

29Some exceptions are the Miami and Muskingum Conservancy Districts in Ohio, the Willamette
River basin studies in Oregon, and the Central Valley developments in California.
:0 See COMM'N ON INTERcOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 36-58.
'Id. at 57.
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Ever since the nineteenth century, when different reimbursement standards were
established for flood control and irrigation, it has been national policy that the obligations of the federal government would not be the same for all phases of water
development. Thus, different schedules of state, local, and private repayments now
exist for hydroelectric power, reclamation, and other functions. Two criteria which
have figured prominently in determining the portion of costs to be borne by the
federal government, although not on any scientific basis, have been the probabilities
of disaster and the degree to which the benefits are local in character. Recent studies,
such as those of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, have attempted
to define more precisely the division of payment between the levels of government
2
for various functions
Both the federal government and the states, however, bear obligations and responsibiities for water resources development that go beyond specific functions or activities.
Certain objectives need to be kept in view in determining what is desirable participation by both levels of government in this area. They may be stated as follows:"
First, the federal government bears a responsibility for fostering water resources
projects which result in a maximum national economic and social product. The
social product is not easily identified, much less measured, but it includes tangible
factors, such as the number of kilowatt hours produced by a project, and intangible
factors, such as the project's contribution to the welfare of a minority group. It is
the task of the political process at the national level to weigh the types of developments in specific locations that will contribute most to the total social product.
Another federal objective in water resources development should be to achieve
optimum income distribution. Federal expenditures cannot be justified for projects
the benefits of which accrue to a few dominant persons or groups. The concept of
minimum income standards is an integral part of the nation's democratic traditions
and needs to be observed in these undertakings.
Closely related to the foregoing point is the obligation of the federal government
to see that water resources development programs promote and maintain democratic
institutions. Decisions involving these programs should be reached with as much
public participation as possible. The nation has a stake in formulating water plans
which are representative and reflect the public interest.
Finally, the federal government bears a responsibility for aiding states to undertake
water resources development programs which will make a distinctive contribution
to the national economy and which cannot be underwritten locally. The federal
government can assist states in translating national goals into regional programs.
U3I PRESIDENT'S WVATER REsouRcEs POLICY COM'N, op. ct. supra note 4, at 67-86. See also
oN VATER REsouRcEs POLICY, op. cit. supra note 23 and House Committee
on Public Works, The Allocation of Costs of Federal Water Resources Development Projects, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (952).
" Some of the discussion for these paragraphs has been adapted from Interregional Linkages, in
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY Co.ia.
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Where states or regions are adversely affected by the consequences of developments
within other regions, such as was the case when industry migrated from New
England to regions in which the federal government had financially supported
projects offering hydroelectric power at lower rates, the federal government also
has an obligation to assist the disadvantaged areas in making economic readjustments.
National policy should be designed to compensate for serious regional dislocations
and to promote equilibrium between the competing economies of different basins.
The states, likewise, need to strive for certain objectives in intergovernmental
participation in water resources development. If states view their interests within
the framework of the national economy, then federal policies should complement
state programs. The states, in the long run, stand to benefit from national policies
which foster maximum economic product, optimum income distribution, democratic
decision-making, and the like. The states, however, need to protect their rights by
striving for the following objectives:
First, states should endeavor to receive benefits from water resources development programs proportionate to their contribution. Individual states may well lose
their share of rightful gains to other states unless they press their claims. This, of
course, does not preclude a state, for reasons of national policy, from receiving benefits
from water resources development above and beyond its proportional share at specific
stages of its growth. Indeed, in a growing economy it may be expected that there
will be some disequilibrium between states and basins; but disproportionate benefits
should be explicitly recognized and justified by national policy.
The states should resist water resources development programs which would
permit areas outside the basin from draining off local resources without corresponding
contributions to the national economy. The states need to be on guard that basins
do not become satellites of other regions. Though economic ties will be inevitably
stronger between some basins than others, the relationships should be of mutual
benefit.
-Equally important is the objective that states should be permitted to organize the
economies of basins with as much self-containment as is desired, consonant with
the national interest. Economies which are reasonably diversified are more apt to
develop the potentialities of states. Moreover, a diversified economy proliferates
economic and social groups and provides a stronger political base.
Finally, states should endeavor to have as many political decisions as possible
concerning water resources development made locally. Some decisions involving interregional and national issues should be reached at the national level, but if national
policies concerning a basin's development are clear, then a greater number of
corollary decisions can have local origins. Decentralizing the decision-making process
into the state and local areas offers the advantage of broadened popular participation.
Enough of the basic interests of both the federal government and the states in
water resofirces development has been set forth to show that the reconciliation of
these objectives into a logical plan calls for balanced and pervasive intergovernmental
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relationships. Undue domination of one level of government by the other not only
reduces the possibilities of achieving optimum development, but it weakens the basic
structure of federalism. Where there are political or financial obstacles, it may be
desirable to have either the federal government or the states take the leadership in
getting a project under way, but provision for subsequent joint participation should
be made.
B. Effectiveness of Federal-State Relationships
Over the years, a high degree of cooperation has evolved between various agencies
of the federal government and the states in the formulation and administration of
water plans. To cite some diverse examples, in the field of research, the Geological
Survey has been working with state water agencies in the measurement of surface
and ground water supplies, the Bureau of Reclamation with state agricultural
experiment stations in the study of irrigation practices, and the Fish and Wildlife
Service with state university departments of wildlife management on animal habitat
factors. In the field of legislation, many programs call for either joint program
formulation or review. Thus, a majority of the states followed the United States
Department of Agriculture's model enabling act in establishing state soil conservation
districts; the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers are required to
furnish proposed projects to the states for consultation and review; and the recently
enacted Water Pollution Control Act34 instructs the Public Health Service to work
with state agencies in the formulation of pollution-control programs.
Federal-state relationships are perhaps most intermeshed in administrative and
operating phases of water resources development programs. Several federal agencies
use joint facilities with state agencies and exchange equipment. The Soil Conservation Service furnishes much of the technical services to local conservation districts.
The Corps of Engineers often works out a shared program of construction with
state and local public works agencies. 5 Perhaps the most extensive federal-state
relationships are those of the Bureau of Reclamation, which, under federal statutes,
negotiates water contracts with local districts to build and operate projects for the
distribution of water in accordance with state water law, with the facilities being
divided between the federal government and local districts when the project is paid
for.

Some equally complex federal-state cost-sharing arrangements have been worked
out. As examples, states now furnish rights-of-way and obtain land sites for Corps
of Engineers projects. Matching grants are extensively employed. Federal loans
are available to finance municipal sewage-treatment facilities. Payments in lieu of
taxes are made to local units by the United States Department of Agriculture for
federal acquisition of land for reservoir sites and project facilities.
(1948), 33 U.S.C. §466 (1952).
description of the involved relationships of the Corps of Engineers with state and local governments is to be found in RicHARD W. BiGGER, FLOOD CONTROL IN METROPOLiTAN Los ANGELEs (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of California at Los Angeles Library 1954).
S'62 STAT. 1155
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Despite extensive and well-worked-out arrangements between many agencies,
however, federal-state relationships have not been conducive to unified water
resources planning and development. A review of recent progress in the Missouri,
Columbia, Colorado, and Arkansas-White-Red River basins, to mention four of
the more prominent, reveals a number of shortcomings. Too much of the planning
and programming between federal and state agencies has been unilateral, without
sufficient relationship to basin-wide objectives and needs. As the President's Water
Policy Commission reported, ". . . projects are undertaken as if they were ends in
themselves, instead of parts of a program designed to meet the needs of the land
and of our people." ' Agencies, such as the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation, employ different standards of measurement and feasibility, so that
competing programs are offered to the states for bargaining and compromise3 7
State programs and agencies have often been too weak to get full advantage from
cooperating with federal agencies. The Federal Pollution Control Program, for
example, is not as successful as it could be, because in many states, adequate regulatory measures have not been enactedas Perhaps most important of all, the states,
independently or collectively, have not sufficiently identified their basic interests and
objectives in water resources development so that common goals can be effectively
achieved.
Much has been written since World War II about administrative arrangements
designed to improve water resources development programs. Although most of the
writers will agree that basins are sufficiently different in character to warrant some
distinctive administrative framework, proposals for organizational reform fall into
three basic categories: (i) those which emphasize more federal leadership; (2) those
which emphasize more state leadership; and (3)those which emphasize more
shared responsibilities between the federal government and the states. Let us look
briefly at federal-state relationships under each of these alternatives.
Advocates of stronger federal leadership support either the establishment of an
independent corporation for each basin, along the lines of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, or interdepartmental coordinating commissions for each basin with a
chairman appointed by the President.3 3 Since the second form of organization has
not been instituted, observations concerning federal-state relationships must be limited
to the experience of the TVA. Those who have observed the salutary changes that
have taken place in state and local government in the seven states within the
basin would be inclined to agree that, if anything, TVA has revitalized many
3i

"A

PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, op.

dt. supra note 4, at 43.
number of these conflicts are set forth in MissouRI BASIN SURVEY CONIN.t'N, MISSoURI: LA1ND ANI.

WATER 215-22 (1953).

" Id. at i8o.
"'For a cogent analysis of the merits of the commission plan, see McKinley, The Valley Atthorii.v
The interdepartmental coordinating comand Its Alternatives, 44 Am. POL. SCI. REv. 607 (195o).
mission was favored by the President's Water Resources Policy Commission.
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state institutions.4 ° Many of the statutory provisions setting forth the Authority's
powers have required participation with state and local governments. 4 ' The philosophy of Lilienthal, Morgan, Clapp, and others who have shaped the Authority's
programs have been anti-big government in viewpoint. 42 Generally speaking, the
governors and representatives in Congress from the TVA region have been the
Authority's strongest supporters, which would hardly be the case if the agency were
deemed to be undermining the states.4 3 On several counts, therefore, the Authority
would appear to receive a clean bill of health with respect to state relationships.
Yet, there is evidence that perhaps federal-state relationships in the Tennessee
Valley have not been studied intensively enough, and that, in fact, the states in that
region have lost some basic powers over water resources development which they
cannot expect to regain short of state recapture of the entire project. A recent study
by Elliot Roberts finds that in such basic operations as navigation, power distribution
and regulation, and flood control, the TVA exercised exclusive or dominant jurisdiction.4 4 On ancillary issues, such as research or payments in lieu of tdxes, Roberts'
analysis indicates that the TVA was more willing to seek state aid and participation
so long as its control over the basic aspects of river development would not be
compromised. Although the author does not decry the TVA dominance, he concludes, in his final chapter, that a "myth of partnership" has been built around
federal-state relationships in the Tennessee Valley.
Perhaps the TVA experience demonstrates that it is impossible to divide the
basic responsibilities for the control of a river between two levels of government
and agencies. Certainly, Roberts' conclusions will give incentive to supporters of
state control to improve their arsenal of administrative weapons. To state advocates,
a limited number of courses of action are open, depending upon whether the basin
is largely within a state or cuts across state lines.
Concerning intrastate basins, the state, with the participation of private enterprise,
may either (i) own and operate the facilities; (2) own the facilities and authorize
federal operation; or (3) operate the facilities under federal ownership. With the
exception of the Central Valley in California, drainage basins lying within the confines of one state are relatively small, and these, in a majority of cases, feed into
interstate basins, so that the states are not in a very good position to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction on major watersheds. However, a few states have fostered state or
private ownership of facilities in some intrastate basins. The Wisconsin Valley
Improvement Company, under state regulation, has developed the power facilities for
"0
See, e.g., Ray, The Influence of the Tennessee Valley Authority on Government in the South, 43
Am. POL. Sc,. REV. 922 (949).
"'See Durisch, TVA and State and Local Government, in RoscoE C. MARTIN (ED.), TVA, THE
FIRsT TWENTY YEARS C. 15 (1956).
2See DAvWD E. LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MAc
(x944); see also GORDON R. CLAPP,
THE TVA: AN APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGION 71-92 (1955).
"n See ELLIOT ROBERTS, ONE RIVER-SEvEN STATES: TVA-STATE

THE TENNESSEE RwER 2 (1955).

" Id. at 89-96.
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the entire length of the Wisconsin River 5 In Montana, the State Water Conservation Board has developed projects totalling "26.7 per cent of the total acreage irrigated
'
in the State."46
Although these kinds of examples are few and far between, the
evidence suggests that state and local governments could be more resourceful in
initiating and conducting basin programs.
With respect to alternative (2), to the author's knowledge, there are no instances
of state ownership of basin facilities under federal operation, nor is this alternative
being recommended by states' rights advocates. Where a state is financially able
to construct projects, little would be gained from the state's viewpoint from placing
the management of these projects in federal hands. The states might jointly pledge
their resources to develop a project on an interstate stream to be operated by the
federal government, but this circumstance appears unlikely.
There is more support for alternative (3)-namely, state operation of federallyowned projects. This method is being currently proposed in California for the
Central Valley, where the federal government has a large investment which presently
appears too great for that state financially to assume. How much the principle of
partnership would gain would depend upon the standards which the federal government sets for the project's operation. One expert who has carefully studied the
California proposal concludes that there is little likelihood "that the application of
federal laws or controls would be relaxed."' Even so, many persons believe that
there are advantages to be derived by the states from state operation of basin projects
under federal ownership, despite strict federal standards.
C. Interstate Compacts
The more serious problem of federal-state relationships is found in the interstate
basin. Here, the interstate compact has been the primary organizational arrangement
proposed. Until the enactment of the Colorado River Compact in 1928, the interstate compact, as far as water resources are concerned, had been primarily used to
settle boundary disputes.48 The Colorado River Compact was hailed as the beginning
of a new era in state water development because it was the first compact to deal with
the interstate allocation of water resources and because it covered a large basin. Since
that time, nearly a score of interstate water compacts have been negotiated, among
the most recent significant ones being the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact in
i 9 48, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact in 1949, the Connecticut River
Compact in 1953, and the Columbia River Commission and the Great Lakes Compacts, the latter two now in the process of ratification.49
"'See Engel, Wisconsin's Answer to a River Problem, American Forests, Sept. 1950, p. 7.

" See R. W. BowmAN, RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN 105 (Agricultural

Experiment Station, Montana State College Mimeo. Circ. No. 58, 195i).
"'Statement by Norman Sturm, California Division of Water Resources, quoted in HANSEN,

op,

cit.

supra note 19, at z36.

" See FREDERcIC L. ZIMMERMAN AND MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SIcNE925,
c. 1 (1951).
" For a list of interstate compacts, see COUNCIL OF SrATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSATE COMPACTn 17831956 (1956).
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Proponents have lauded the compacts as an instrument for water resources development on a number of fronts. It is presumed to offer greater opportunity for
state initiative and responsibility; it permits local and regional solutions to the immediate problems of an area; it is stated to be a good vehicle for the establishment
of joint administrative machinery; it requires both state and federal consent to be
operative; and it is an excellent instrument for fostering a healthy federalism. 0
Even the most ardent enthusiasts of the compact, however, would admit that in no
major basin of the country has the compact succeeded in placing the states on a par
ivith the federal government in water resources development. No administrative
agency has yet been evolved out of a compact with sufficient powers and funds to
plan for, much less carry out, an integrated basin-wide program.
Critics, in turn, acknowledge that the compact has limited usefulness as an interstate device for resolving legal issues or specific disputes but point out that it is
not the machinery for dealing with functions that must be administratively evolved
and in which the signatories have competing interests. The commission appointed
by the President to make recommendations for administrative organization for the
Missouri basin concluded that interstate compacts do not build sufficient regional
loyalty and that even a federal-state compact in which the federal government was
a more active member "goes too far in the direction of elevating localized state
51
interest over those of the basin and the nation."
A reappraisal of the interstate compact leads to the conclusion that, to date, this
method has not fostered much integrated water resources development but that it
has virtues as an instrument for intergovernmental cooperation. It would appear
that we may now be in a position to capitalize on our experience and use compacts
as a means of sharing intergovernmental responsibilities and obligations. The chief
weakness of compacts has been that they have negotiated agreements too precisely
and in too much detail, without sufficient information and study of the problems involved. Moreover, compacts have not provided the proper kind of administrative
machinery to deal with the evolving problems of a basin. Some of the newer
compacts are endeavoring to deal with these shortcomings. The Upper Colorado
River Basin Compact creates an interstate administrative agency and provides for
some administrative discretion in dealing with water allocations. 52 The Sabine River
Compact negotiated between Louisiana and Texas in 1956 provides "for a degree
'53
of administrative adjudication of water rights by the interstate compact agency.
Interstate compacts, however, will never be wholly successful unless they can be
effectively tied into existing federal-state arrangements.
" See ZIMMaRa

N AND WENDELL,

Op. ct. supra note 48, C. 7; VINCENT THTuR3sY, INTER

ATE

COOPEnArsON c. 6 (1953); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BoOK OF rm STATES, 1950-1951, at
32-33 (1950).
lMssouti BASIN StvEY COrM'N, op. cit. supra note 37, at io.
For a reply to the Commission's
statements on the compact method, see Zimmerman and Wendell, Representation of the Region in

Missouri Basin Organization, 48 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 152 (1954).
13
Act of April 6, 1949, art. 8, 63 STAT. 35.
55

See COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs, op. cit. supra note I, at 17.
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D. Interagency Basin Committees
A new administrative device which has been developed during the last decade
to improve intergovernmental coordination has been the interagency basin committee. Pressures for establishing coordinating committees emanated at both the state
and federal levels. During the late i93o's, a number of the states became concerned
that they needed some sort of interstate organization to counter the dominance of
federal programs and to stave off the threat of valley authorities. Federal officials,
in turn, feared growing adverse public reaction to the conflicts and competing
programs of federal agencies, highlighted during the war by the Bureau of Reclamation-Corps of Engineers controversy in the Missouri basin. In addition, at both
levels of government, there was a genuine desire to improve water resources planning
and development.
The genesis of the basin committee was in the Missouri basin when, in 1942, the
five northern states organized the Missouri Basin States Committee, shortly thereafter
expanded to include all ten states of that watershed."4 This was followed, in 1943,
by the creation of a Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee (FIARBC) in
Washington, D. C., established by informal agreement and composed of the heads
of the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, Federal Power Commission, and
the Land-Use Coordinator of the Department of Agriculture.r 5 Passage of the
Flood Control Act of 1944,r" which approved the Pick-Sloan Plan for the development
of the Missouri basin, gave further impetus to the establishment, in 1945, of a
regional interagency basin committee for the Missouri basin, composed of representatives of parent agencies of the FIARBC and including, by invitation, the
governors of the states.
Since that time, interagency basin committees have been organized for four other
major regions: the Columbia (1946); the Pacific Southwest (1948); the ArkansasWhite-Red (i95o); and New England-New York (i95o). The basin committees
are similar in that they all have approximately the same federal agency representation. Three, the Columbia, Missouri, and Pacific Southwest Committees, were
set up by the parent committee in Washington and are voluntary but continuing
bodies; whereas the Arkansas-White-Red and New England-New York Committees
were created by presidential directive to prepare "a survey report for submission to
the Congress." 7 All have approximately the same federal agency membership, and
all but the Pacific Southwest Committee have official state representation. Three of
the committees have rotating chairmanships, and all, with the exception of the
Missouri Basin Committee, do considerable work through subcommittees. All of
5' See Minutes for Joint Meeting of the Missouri Basin and Arkansas-White-Red Basins Inter-Agency
Committees, Vicksburg, Miss., Jan. 31, 1954, p. 2.
Sid. at 6. The Departments of Commerce; Health, Education, and Welfare; and Labor subsequently
joined the FIARBC.
" 58 STAr. 887, 33 U.S.C. §7o (1952).
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the basin committees meet several times a year to furnish the membership with
information concerning the development of agency programs and to discuss problems
of a technical and administrative nature. An examination of the minutes of the
committees shows considerable variation in the degree of participation both among
federal agencies and state representatives, with meetings that were relatively uneventful and others marked by considerable controversy. None of the committees,
58
however, can take action unless there is unanimous agreement.
What have the interagency basin committees done to improve federal-state relationships in water resources planning? They have served as a means of interdepartmental and interjurisdictional communication and have fostered an awareness of
basin-wide problems2 9 They have facilitated a certain amount of cooperation in
research and administrative operation. On occasion, the basin committees have been
able to solve minor issues which unattended would have led to friction between
agency personnel.
The interagency basin committees, however, have not become integrated intergovernmental planning bodies. In the Arkansas-White-Red basin, where the Committee was most closely knit and where the pressures for coordination from Washington were greatest, the Committee could not reach agreement on one basic plan
for stream development. The experience in that region demonstrated that federal
agencies in particular were opposed to any basin plans which did not conform to
the policies of their respective agencies 0° Parallel situations existing in the other
basins led the Hoover Commission Task Force to conclude that coordination would
continue to fail until there were stronger congressional directives, more consistent
policies, and a review board "which is by law superior to the agencies."'"
The states, on the whole, have not exercised a very influential role in those basins
where they are participating oia the committee. Their interests in specific problems
have varied, depending upon their geographical location in the basin.6 2 They have
been reluctant to become involved in federal agency controversies and have preferred
dealing unilaterally with federal agencies. Moreover, being sovereign units, the
63
states have not felt fully committed to basin committee agreements.
Nevertheless, despite the inadequacies of interagency basin committees, recent
presidential commission studies, including the Hoover Commission Task Force on
Water Resources and Power and the Presidential Advisory Committee on Water
Resources Policy, have recommended the continuation and strengthening of these
bodies. It has been generally recognized that interagency basin committees do
IS

Id. at 1441.

e.g., COLUMBIA BASIN INTER-AGENCY CommiTrEE, PLAN FoR DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES or THE PAcIFIc NORTrWEST (1952).
" See IRVING K. Fox AND ISABEL PIcKxN, THE UPSTREAM-DowNSTREAM FLOOD CONTROL CONTROVERSY
IN THE ARKANSAs-WITE-RED BASINS SURVEY (to be published).
o See,
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provide a much-needed mechanism for federal-state cooperation in regional water
developments. Their future success, however, will depend upon other changes in
state and federal policies which need to take place before a good working environment is achieved.
III
STATES
STRENGTHENING THE ROLE oF THME

Since i95o, five federally-created commissions have studied various aspects of
federal-state relationships in water resources development-namely, the President's
Water Resources Policy Commission (i95o), the Missouri Basin Survey Commission
(1953), the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1955), the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (r955), and the Presidential Advisory Committee on Water Resources Policy (955). In addition, there
has been state sponsorship of studies by the Council of State Governments. 4 Although the investigations of these bodies vary widely in purpose and philosophy,
a number of conclusions can be drawn concerning desirable trends.
Without exception, all of the above-named commissions recommended that the role
of the states in water resources development should be strengthened. As the
President's Water Resources Policy Commission stated, the states perform functions
which "are indispensable to full development of water resources and realization of
benefits from them."" It was generally recognized that a river may come under
both federal and state jurisdiction during the course of its flow and be subject to
various types of appropriation, all of which calls for programs involving a high
degree of coordinated planning and operation. Both the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the Presidential Advisory Committee placed a high
premium on maintaining a vigorous federal system, the latter Committee commenting that66
complete Federal assumption of responsibility [for the development of the nation's water
resources] ... would destroy the effectiveness of the government of the States and
work a profound and undesirable change in our traditional plan of government.
The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
perhaps the most outspoken on the states' rights issue, flatly recommended that
whenever possible water resources developments "should be discharged by state or
local governments ... or by private enterprise.""7

The commissions were also in general agreement that federal-state water resources
" At the request of the Missouri Basin States Committee, the Council of State Governments, in 1952,
drafted a somewhat unique federal-interstate compact for the Missouri basin. The Council has assisted
a number of other states in the negotiation of interstate compacts and has often been the spokesman
for the state position.
asX PRESIDENT'S WVATER
REsouRCEs POLICY COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 4, at 49.
as PRESDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM. ON WATER RESOURCES POLICY, op. ct. supra note 23, at 2-3.
67I U.S. COMM'N ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH op THE GOVERNMENT, Op. cit.
supra note 57, at 36.
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relationships should be organized and coordinated around the river basin. Indeed,
this was the major theme of both the President's Water Resources Policy Commission and the Missouri Basin Survey Commission reports. Both commissions
found that federal and state agencies pursued a functional approach to water resources
development that thwarted good intergovernmental relationships in basin development, and both maintained that our system of federalism would be strengthened by
the adoption of the basin concept. The Presidential Advisory Committee, however,
warned that though basin development of water resources was generally sound, "in
some instances consideration of water resources development should be viewed from
the standpoint of a region rather than solely from that of a river basin.""8
The other major area in which the findings of the federal commissions were in
substantial agreement concerned the adverse impact that competing federal policies
and administrative organization have had upon effective state participation. The
Presidential Advisory Committee stated that "the fact that the Federal interest in
water resources development has been expressed in different laws empowering
differing agencies to pursue particular programs for particular purposes" is the
greatest single weakness in the lack of administrative coordination between the
federal government and the states.P9 All of the commissions recommended that
the federal government needed to strengthen its own administrative household in
order to work effectively with the states.
Beyond these general areas of agreement, the commissions, primarily federallyoriented, varied widely in specific proposals for strengthening the position of the
states in water resources development. The only commission specifically charged
with studying the role of the states was the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and in the water field, its analysis was not too extended. There has been no
recent governmental or quasi-public study which has examined the whole field of
water policy from the standpoint of the states. Were an objective study undertaken,
it is likely that the following courses of action would be proposed:
A. Administrative Reorganization
A majority of the states desperately need to overhaul their administrative structure
for water resources development if they expect to keep pace with federal programs.
The State of California, for example, with all of its tremendous water developments,
hobbled along until recently with administration of natural resources sprawled
over four major departments, ten independent agencies, and forty boards and commissions 7 With this kind of divided organization, it is impossible to achieve an
integrated state water program. Good reorganization does not necessarily mean
that all state water agencies need to be consolidated into one department. It does
require, however, an administrative structure that will give coherence to state policies
S PREsiDENTrAL

ADvIsoRY COMM. ox WATa REsouRCEs POLICY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3-4.

"d. at 2.
A new Department of Water Resources was created in 1956, although the reorganization of water
agencies is not yet fully accomplished.
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and programs and which will foster coordination around watershed and drainage
basins.
Moreover, reorganization of state water agencies must be related to other natural
resources functions. Good state programs for drainage basins cannot be developed
unless land planning, forestry, recreational, and wildlife activities are intermeshed.
The establishment of natural resources coordinating boards at the state level, such
as the President's Water Resources Policy Commission has suggested, is not enough
unless the boards have legislative and executive powers to formulate and review
programs.7 ' Experience has shown that agencies with vested program interests and
strong clientele support are not easily persuaded by an advisory body to change
their basic policies. Shifting the pattern of state resources operations from a functional to a drainage-basin approach needs approval of both legislative and executive
branches. State integration of resources agencies will facilitate better working
relationships with the federal government and promote more wholesome political
support within the state for balanced resources programs.
B. Policy Formulation and Planning
The states need to give more attention to the formulation of water resources
policies and plans, both on an intrastate and intergovernmental basis. Most of the
states do not have an adequate water research or planning staff. Little long-range
planning is being done. The states are in a weak position to cooperate with the
federal government on this front.
There have been a number of proposals to improve state water planning. One
of the more prominent is that states should re-establish state planning commissions
charged with the responsibility of the long-range physical developments of the state.
If a planning commission is not created, the Presidential Advisory Committee has
suggested that a minimum step would be the employment of a moderate staff to
participate on a continuing basis "at all stages of water resources planning." 2 Such
a staff would go a long way toward integrating the research activities of various state
agencies and relating them to federal research programs. Another improvement
would be the institution of a water resources budget that would reflect both immediate and long-term expenditures and which would present an over-all picture of the
state's program. Effective budget preparation fosters public understanding and wise
legislative action. Finally, good planning could be fostered by better legislative review of administrative programs. In this connection, it has been suggested that the
establishment of a joint committee in the legislature to consider resources programs
would result in better policy formulation.73
If the states improve planning at the state level, they will then be able to participate more effectively in interstate basin planning. The states should participate in the
1i PRESMENT'S WVATERREsouRcEs POLICY Coms'N, op. cit. supra note 4, at .5.
'

PRESIoENTAL ADvIsoy Coim . oN WxAri RsouRcEs Pokcy, op. cit. supra note 23, at 15.
LAURENCE L. DuIUscH AND HERSALL L. MACON, UpoN ITs OWN REsoUcEs 12r (1951).
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initiation of regional programs not simply for the purpose of protecting state interests, but to harmonize state plans with federal and other state developments. Provisions should be inserted in appropriate federal statutes requiring federal agencies
to formulate basin-wide programs in conjunction with the states. Future legislation
might be patterned after the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 and the Watershed
Protection Act of I954," 4 which provide for a greater degree of federal-state participation in the formulation of programs than has heretofore existed. The Council of
State Governments might also be more effectively used as an instrument by the
states to promote interstate cooperation in water resources planning.
C. State Review of Federal Programs
The states' position in water resources development would be immeasurably
strengthened if all federal water resources agencies were required to submit proposed
project plans to each of the affected states for official review. The Flood Control
Act of 1944 requires the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Interior to follow
this procedure, and the Department of Agriculture, by administrative ruling, has now
adopted the same practice. 5 The states are usually given sixty to ninety days to
prepare official comments, which are transmitted to Congress attached to the project
reports.
All of the recent commissions which have studied the provisions for state review
of federal projects have recommended that this requirement be applied to other
federal agencies. However, this procedure has not been wholly successful. The
time allotted for review has not always given the states adequate time to study the
proposals carefully.7 6 Furthermore, neither federal agencies nor Congress have
attached sufficient importance to state comments. A remedy would be to adopt the
principle set forth in the Watershed Protection Act of 1954 which requires state approval before federal aid can be granted or projects constructed 7 But to apply this
procedure to all interstate projects would be unwise, since individual states with minor
interests at stake could hold up developments indefinitely. A more desirable policy
might call for interagency basin committee consideration of state comments with
the purpose of reconciling, wherever possible, federal-state conflicts7 8 Careful examination of the state positions by the United States Bureau of the Budget would also
be desirable.
D. Joint Federal-State Financing
Previous paragraphs have pointed out that the states have not been sufficiently
resourceful in organizing their financial means to participate in large water resources
development projects. The position of the states to criticize and propose alternatives
to federal projects would be immeasurably strengthened if they assumed a bigger
7' 68 STAT. 666, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§10o-o7 (Supp. MI, 1956).
SSee MIssouI BASIN SURvE Comm'N, op. cit. supra note 37, at 250.
o See PRESIDENTIAL ADvisoRY COMMf. ON WATER RESOURCES POLICY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 14.
1T
See Co1a'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION 9 (1955).
ON WATER RESOURCES POLICY, Op. cit. Suipra note 23, at 17.
18 See PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY CoMMtae.
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share of the financing. Federal agencies, anxious to have no delay or formidable
obstacles to their plans, have likewise been at fault for not supporting vigorously the
principle of greater state financial participation.
The recent commission studies were unanimous in recommending that the states
and local governments and private beneficiaries should bear a greater portion of
the cost of water resources development. In general, the commissions favored
clearer determinations of national and local benefits, with the states and private
beneficiaries assuming costs attributable to the latter. Although official reports
have not been too explicit, what specific steps might the states take? First of all, the
adoption of better budget planning would provide a better picture of state resources
which could be allocated to water resources development. More adequate fiscal planning might also enable the states to work out long-term arrangements for project
financing. The states could recapture some of the water project costs by levies upon
identifiable beneficiaries. The federal government, in turn, could use matching
grants and grants-in-aid with more ingenuity to induce state financial participation.
The costs of programs could be worked out jointly by the federal government and
the states well in advance of construction schedules and the states obligated to finance
their portion of the costs on the basis of pre-agreed time schedules. This would
give the states and local governments a longer opportunity to raise revenues and
plan for necessary fiscal adjustments.
E. Joint Federal-State Management
The extent to which the states could construct and operate water resources
projects jointly with the federal government or take over the operation and maintenance of projects established by the federal government have not been fully
explored. Whether the public welfare would always be served by more state operation is debatable, in view of the special interests of groups in many states that are
pressuring for state control of projects now under federal jurisdiction. Yet, this is
an issue that will be raised with increasing frequency as the federal government
multiplies its efforts in the water resources field and the pressures for decentralization become greater. The Presidential Advisory Committee recommended that
"operation of water resources projects be turned over to non-Federal interests as soon
as possible in all cases where this is practicable," but it did not spell out the standards
that should be maintained in various kinds of projects before federal ownership or
responsibilities would be relinquished. 9
Obviously, the majority of states do not contemplate operation of large multipurpose development projects, particularly those which are interstate. The states,
however, could assume greater responsibility for the operation of smaller developments or manage specific projects in a basin-wide system under basic federal statutes.
It would appear that a system of operation such as this may be evolving in California.
Legislation with bipartisan support has recently been introduced in both houses of
"Id. at 34.
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Congress which would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to enter into an
agreement wtih the State of California to construct and operate the San Luis unit,
a major multiple-purpose project of the Central Valley Project.8 0 Under the bill,
the project would be tied into both the federal and state water resources development
plans, both units of government would share costs of construction and maintenance,
and both would manage portions of the facilities. Although a great number of
administrative arrangements would have to be worked out if the plan went into
effect, this legislation heralds a new stage in federal-state cooperation.
Both the nation and the states have much to gain from encouraging states to
share in the operation of water resources projects with the federal government, even
though present federal policies in such fields as irrigation and power distribution
prevail. To participate effectively, most of the states would be forced to make some
desirable improvements in their administrative structure and operating standards.
State and local financial contributions to projects would probably increase. State
operation could foster greater local participation and a better adaptation of operating
conditions to local circumstances might result.
F. Intergovernmental Administrative Arrangements
Increasingly complex water resources developments will call for closer intergovernmental relationships for basin planning. Not only should existing administrative instruments, such as the interstate compact and the interagency basin committee, be improved, but new and varied arrangements should be devised. The
interstate compact is a slow and cumbersome process for developing a basin, but it
can be a useful means for achieving understanding among units of government.
It needs to be employed as an instrument to promote administrative agreement
rather than to magnify differences. It is noteworthy that the governors of California
and Oregon have recently signed a compact designed to promote the comprehensive
development of the Klamath River basin through administrative cooperation, without
lengthy litigation."1 More consideration should also be given to compacts in which
the federal government participates with the states in drafting the provisions.
Despite shortcomings, the interagency basin committees offer a framework for
fostering further federal-state cooperation. It is to the states' advantage to have
them created for all major basins. The committees should be strengthened both
from the standpoint of federal agency coordination and state representation. Following the recommendations of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission,
they should be given legislative status, a presidentially appointed chairman, and
responsibilities for basin-wide planning8 2 To bring the states into membership as
genuine participants presents some difficult questions of voting rights, particularly if
thie committees are given formal powers of coordination and clearance; but this can be
s S. 1887, 85th Cong., istSess. (i957); H.R. 6035, H.R. 7295, 85 th Cong., 1st Sess. (957).
s See Sacramento Bee, April i8,1957, p. E-I. For terms of the compact, see California; Senate Bill
1991 (1957).
82I PRESIDENTS WATER RESOURCES POLICY CoMM'N, op. cit. supra note 4, at 49.
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worked out if problems are recognized as having different orders of magnitude for
which a single voting formula on all matters is not desirable.
As another possible form of intergovernmental cooperation, consideration should
also be given to the possibility of establishing mixed-ownership corporations which
would promote and finance improvements, both public and private. The form of
the corporation might be patterned along the lines of the Federal Farm Credit and
Land Bank organization. The federal government might provide initial working
funds but permit state and local governments and accredited private groups to subscribe capital and participate in the management of the corporation through regional
or state water resources banks. Projects could be undertaken which might be
partially or wholly financed by corporation funds and vary in size from small local
improvements to fairly extensive drainage basin programs. Obviously, the establishment of semi-independent corporations raises many implications for state and
federal policies and programs. Corporation projects would undoubtedly have to be
reviewed to make sure that they did not conflict with established plans for basin
development. Nevertheless, this may be a fruitful way of encouraging local initiative as well as facilitating some wholesome decentralization in basin programs.
In conclusion, let it be noted that no basic changes in federal or state powers are
necessary to institute the reforms that have been proposed here. Our federal system
is adequate, provided that we build wisely upon the existing pattern of intergovernmental relationships. What is sorely needed is public recognition and support for
a comprehensive program of water resources development, and legislative and
administrative ingenuity in devising the best policies and implementing arrangements
for each basin. The information with which to proceed is not lacking. The nation
has now had the benefits of a number of major studies and investigations to guide
the courses of action. It is high time that both the federal government and the
states take steps to carry out the proposals.

